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ABSTRACT
Hashtag has emerged as a widely used concept of popular culture
and campaigns, but its implications on people’s privacy have not
been investigated so far. In this paper, we present the first systematic
analysis of privacy issues induced by hashtags. We concentrate
in particular on location, which is recognized as one of the key
privacy concerns in the Internet era. By relying on a random forest
model, we show that we can infer a user’s precise location from
hashtags with accuracy of 70% to 76%, depending on the city. To
remedy this situation, we introduce a system called Tagvisor that
systematically suggests alternative hashtags if the user-selected
ones constitute a threat to location privacy. Tagvisor realizes this by
means of three conceptually different obfuscation techniques and a
semantics-based metric for measuring the consequent utility loss.
Our findings show that obfuscating as little as two hashtags already
provides a near-optimal trade-off between privacy and utility in our
dataset. This in particular renders Tagvisor highly time-efficient,
and thus, practical in real-world settings.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The development of information and communication technologies
has progressively changed people’s life style over the last decade.
Nowadays, people widely use online social networks (OSNs) and
instant messaging to communicate with friends and maintain social
relationships. Besides, these new technologies have paved the way
for concepts such as “like”, “follow” and “share”, which have been
assimilated by OSN users within no time. One popular concept
among these is the hashtag. Defined as a word or non-spaced phrase
preceded by the hash character #, hashtag was created to serve as
a metadata tag for people to efficiently search for information.
Originally created on Twitter, hashtags have been widely adopted
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in many areas. Media campaigns are increasingly using hashtags
to attract and engage customers (e.g., #ShareACoke). Hashtags also
enable people to stay updated on trending news stories. For instance,
#imwithher has been extensively used during the US 2016 election.
Hashtags have seen significant usage in online communication
recently. Users have created many hashtags to convey meanings
which previously did not exist in the English vocabulary. For in-
stance, #like4like indicates a promise of the users to like back the
posts of those who like their post in OSNs [37]; #nofilter means the
associated photo has been posted directly as taken, without being
edited. The large amount of hashtags provide us with an unprece-
dented chance to understand the modern society, and researchers
are increasingly leveraging hashtags to conduct their study [20, 35].
While bringing significant utility benefits, hashtags may carry
sensitive private information about people using them. However,
privacy threats arising out of hashtags have been largely overlooked.
In this paper, we conduct the first study on addressing privacy raised
by hashtags. Among all the private information, we concentrate in
particular on mobility information, which is recognized as one of
the key privacy concerns in themodern society [5, 14, 25, 28]. In fact,
location arguably even constitutes the most sensitive information
being collected by service providers [23] (e.g., being able to infer
that a user is staying at a hospital can severely threaten his privacy),
and it can be used to infer additional sensitive information such as
friendship [4, 33] and demographics [29, 39]. A user can disclose his
location information through many different ways such as sharing
location in OSNs (often referred to as check-in) and allowing mobile
applications to collect their geo-coordinates through GPS sensors
in the smartphone. Many users have recognized the inherent risks
towards their location privacy and abstain from explicitly sharing
their locations. However, hashtags may also leak the exact location
of a user, which is the primary focus of this paper.
Contributions. Our contributions are two-fold: (i) a novel infer-
ence attack for uncovering a user’s fine-grained location based
on posted hashtags, along with a comprehensive evaluation on a
real-life OSN dataset, and (ii) a privacy-enhancing system, namely
Tagvisor, that uses various obfuscation techniques for thwarting
the aforementioned attack.
Attack. Our inference attack aims at predicting the fine-grained
location of a user’s post given its hashtags by learning the asso-
ciations between hashtags and locations. The attack relies on a
random forest classifier and achieves remarkable accuracy.
We empirically evaluate our attack based on a comprehensive
dataset of 239,000 Instagram posts with corresponding locations
and hashtags from three of the largest English-speaking cities (New
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York, Los Angeles and London). The locations we predict are the
exact points of interest (POI) within each of the three cities, such as
Land of Plenty, a Chinese restaurant in New York. The experiments
show that our hashtag-based location-inference attack achieves an
accuracy of 70% in New York (for a number of around 500 consid-
ered locations) and 76% in Los Angeles and London (for around
270 and 140 locations, respectively). We also compare our classi-
fication method with other popular algorithms such as support
vector machine and gradient boosting machine, and show that our
classifier outperforms them by at least 7%. Furthermore, we em-
pirically identify the number of hashtags maximizing the attack
success to be seven. Additionally, we evaluate our attack on a global
level without prior knowledge of the city, and demonstrate that
it can still reach an accuracy of more than 70%. Finally, by con-
sidering two types of attackers, one with prior knowledge on the
targeted users’ hashtags and locations, and the other without, we
show that the accuracy drops by around 20% for the latter attacker.
This demonstrates that the adversary can enhance his model by
learning per-user associations between hashtags and locations.
We stress that our work is not intended for users who inten-
tionally use hashtags to reveal their locations, for example, when a
user publishes a post with #statueofliberty as one of the hashtags.
Instead, our work aims at helping users that might unintentionally
disclose where they are. The examples below, taken from the evalu-
ation of the inference attack, illustrate this point further. A user’s
post shared with hashtags #music, #musicphotography, #soul, #fu-
jifilm, #thephotoladies, and #pancakesandwhiskey may not reveal
anything significant about the location to most individuals. Our
attack however correctly predicts that the user is at the Highline
Ballroom, a music venue in New York. In another example from Los
Angeles, a user sharing #fighton #trojans #band #ftfo is correctly
located by our attack at University of Southern California.
Defense. To counter the aforementioned privacy violations, we de-
velop Tagvisor: a system that provides recommendations, e.g., to
an OSN user who wants to share hashtags without disclosing his
location information. In particular, Tagvisor implements three dif-
ferent obfuscation-based mechanisms: hiding (a subset of) hashtags,
replacing hashtags by semantically similar hashtags, and generaliz-
ing hashtags with higher-level semantic categories (e.g., Starbucks
into coffee shop). Tagvisor returns an optimal subset of obfuscated
hashtags that, at the same time, guarantees some predefined level
of location privacy and retains as much utility as possible. To ac-
curately quantify utility, we rely on an advanced natural language
processing model, namely word2vec [21, 22].
The empirical evaluation of our privacy-enhancing system shows
that: (i) the replacement mechanism outperforms both hiding and
generalization methods, (ii) the higher number of original hashtags,
the better the utility for similar levels of privacy, and (iii) regardless
of the original number of hashtags, obfuscating two hashtags pro-
vides the best trade-off between utility, privacy, and time efficiency.
The latter finding notably demonstrates the practical feasibility of
our privacy-preserving system given the computational capabilities
of current mobile devices.
Organization. In Section 2, we present the user and adversarial
models we consider in this paper as well as the privacy metrics
for attack evaluation. Our location inference attack is described in
Section 3. We introduce our dataset in Section 4 followed by the
experimental evaluation in Section 5. We describe Tagvisor and
the three obfuscation mechanisms for protecting users’ location
privacy in Section 6. Section 7 presents the performance of Tagvisor.
We provide a discussion in Section 8, address the related work in
Section 9, and conclude the paper in Section 10.
2 SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we describe the user and adversarial models, as well
as the privacy metrics used throughout the paper.
2.1 User Model
We use two sets U and L to represent users and locations, respec-
tively. A single user is denoted by u and a location (POI) is denoted
by ℓ. All users’ posts are in set P , and a single post p ∈ P is defined
as a quadruplet ⟨u, ℓ, t , Hp ⟩: semantically, it meansu shares the post
p at ℓ (checks in at ℓ) at time t , and Hp = {h1p ,h2p , . . . ,hmp } contains
all hashtags associated with the post. In addition, Hp ⊆ Hℓ ⊆ H
where Hℓ represents the entire set of hashtags shared (in posts) at
location ℓ and H is the set of all hashtags in our dataset.
2.2 Adversarial Model
In this work, we consider an adversary who intends to infer the
hidden location ℓ of a post p by observing the set of hashtags Hp
published with the post. The adversary can be anyone who is able to
crawl the data from OSNs such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.
Moreover, it could also model a service provider which does not
have access to all its users’ real locations.
In order to accurately infer hidden locations based on hashtags,
the adversary needs to build an accurate knowledge K of associ-
ations between hashtags and locations. In this work, we assume
he learns these associations based on previously disclosed posts
that included both hashtags and location check-ins. This learning
phase is explained in Section 3. The associations can be learned in
different ways. We consider here two different adversarial models.
The first adversary, namely A1, uses all the publicly shared posts
he is able to collect, including those shared by the targeted users
(users whose posts’ locations the adversary intends to infer). In
other words, in this model, we assume the targeted users have al-
ready shared some of their posts with both hashtags and check-ins.
In the second model, the adversary (A2) does not have access to any
previous location-hashtag data shared by the targeted users. This
models the case when the targeted users are particularly privacy-
cautious [24] and do not share any location with their posts. In this
case, the adversary has to rely only on the location and hashtag
data shared by other users to build his knowledge K .
The output of our hashtag-based location inference attack on
a post p is the posterior probability distribution over all locations
ℓ ∈ L given the set of observed hashtags Hp :
Pr(Lp = ℓ |Hp ,K), (1)
where Lp is the random variable representing the location of post
p. Based on this posterior distribution, the most likely location is:
ℓ∗p = argmax
ℓ∈L
Pr(Lp = ℓ |Hp ,K). (2)
Equation 2 is the core concept behind our inference attack, and we
will describe its instantiation in detail in Section 3.
2.3 Privacy Metrics
We measure the location privacy of a user who shares a post p and
its corresponding hashtags Hp by using the expected estimation
error, as proposed in [34]. Formally, given the posterior probability
distribution Pr(Lp = ℓ |Hp ,K), the location privacy is defined as:∑
ℓ∈L
Pr(Lp = ℓ |Hp ,K) · d(ℓ, ℓrp ), (3)
where ℓrp is the real location of the user sharing the postp, andd(·, ·)
denotes a distance function. If the geographical distance dд(ℓ, ℓrp ) is
used, we will generally refer to this metric as the expected distance.
In this paper, we rely on the haversine distance to measure the
geographical distance. If the binary distance, defined as
db (ℓ, ℓrp ) =
{
0 if ℓ = ℓrp
1 otherwise
(4)
is used, Equation 3 is then equal to 1 − Pr(Lp = ℓrp |Hp ,K) and is
referred to as the incorrectness [34]. We also use the correctness
(to quantify the performance of the inference attack), which is
the opposite of the incorrectness, and is simply equal to Pr(Lp =
ℓrp |Hp ,K). We further use the accuracy, defined in the machine
learning context, as another privacy metric. Formally, accuracy is
defined as 1−db (ℓ∗p , ℓrp ), wheredb (·, ·) is the binary distance defined
above. We can alternatively use the inaccuracy, i.e., db (ℓ∗p , ℓrp ). Note
that, depending on the context, the accuracy can refer to one sample
or multiple. In the latter case, the accuracy represents in fact the
average accuracy over all samples (e.g., from a testing set).
3 INFERENCE ATTACK
Our location inference attack relies on a random forest classifier.
We encode the presence of a hashtag hi in a post p as a binary
value x ip , being equal to 1 if it is published with the post, and 0
otherwise. Each post p with its set of hashtags Hp at location ℓ
can be represented by a feature vector ®xp = (x1p , . . . ,xnp ), where
n = |H |, and by the label or class yp , where yp = ℓrp . The length
of the feature vector is thus equal to the total number of unique
hashtags in the entire dataset.
For training the random forest, the adversary uses as input the
samples (®xp ,yp ) ∀p ∈ Ptrain where ®xp = (x1p , . . . ,xnp ) and Ptrain
refers to posts in the training set that contains the auxiliary knowl-
edge of the adversary. The adversary carries out his attack on the
set Ptar by trying to classify each sample post p ∈ Ptar using the
features ®xp on the trained forest. Among several ways of obtaining
class probabilities in an ensemble of decision trees [6], we em-
ploy averaging of the votes of all the trees of the forest. The total
number of trees that vote for each class is divided by the total
number of trees to obtain the posterior probability distribution
Pr(Lp = ℓ |Hp ,K) ∀ℓ ∈ L. This outcome is used to quantify privacy
with the metrics defined in Section 2.3.
4 DATASET
We collect our experimental data from Instagram, one of the most
popular OSNs and the major platform for hashtag sharing. Besides,
Figure 1: Distribution of the proportion of posts with a cer-
tain number of hashtag(s), from 0 to 30 hashtags.
Table 1: Pre-processed data statistics.
New York Los Angeles London
No. of posts 144,263 61,767 34,018
No. of hashtags 8,552 4,600 2,395
No. of users 3,911 1,625 992
No. of locations 498 268 141
Instagram users have been shown to share their locations an order
of magnitude more often than in Twitter [19], and Instagram’s local-
ization function was linked with Foursquare, which enabled us to
enrich each location with name and category, not just geograpical
coordinates as in many existing datasets [9]. The category informa-
tion is in fact a building block for one of our defense mechanisms,
namely the semantic generalization (Section 6).
Our data collection was conducted in January 2016. We concen-
trate on three of the largest cities in the English-speaking world,
namely New York, Los Angeles and London. In the first step, we rely
on the Foursquare API to crawl all the location IDs in the three cities,
and extract these locations’ names and categories. Then, we use the
function /locations/search provided by Instagram’s public API
to map the previously obtained Foursquare’s location IDs to their
corresponding Instagram’s location IDs. Finally, for each Instagram
location, we collect its publicly available posts’ metadata (user ID,
time and hashtags) in the second half of 2015 (2015.7.1-2015.12.31).
As in [4, 9, 30, 33, 38], we perform the following filtering opera-
tions on our collected data.
• We filter out user accounts whose number of followers are
above the 90th percentile (celebrities) or under the 10th per-
centile (bots). To address the data sparseness issue, we also
filter out users with less than 20 check-ins in each city.
• We filter out hashtags appearing less than 20 times in each
city, following a classical filtering strategy used by the natu-
ral language processing community.
• For each city, we concentrate on locations with at least 50
check-ins. This helps us filter out the locations that are rarely
visited by people while still ensuring that we are not only
concentrating on the most famous places. Knowing a user
being at the considered locations still threatens his privacy
to a large extent. Additionally, from a supervised learning
point of view, we need sufficient data for each class (each
location) to train a robust classifier, such that a meaningful
attack can be conducted.
Table 2: Performance of location inference across all the cities for different adversary models and baseline.
New York Los Angeles London All cities
A1 A2 baseline A1 A2 baseline A1 A2 baseline A1 A2 baseline
Correctness 0.613 0.468 0.015 0.685 0.502 0.015 0.686 0.552 0.020 0.624 0.465 0.010
Expected distance (km) 0.917 1.272 4.198 1.870 3.046 11.275 0.857 1.575 4.518 211.471 345.980 3563.082
Accuracy 0.697 0.556 0.053 0.758 0.597 0.048 0.761 0.617 0.051 0.712 0.560 0.045
After the filtering, we obtain 144,263 posts in New York, 61,767
posts in Los Angeles and 34,018 posts in London (Table 1). Despite
the filtering strategies, we are still left with a large dataset with
substantially more users and fine-grained locations compared to
previous works. For instance, the dataset used in [34] contains 20
users’ mobility data in a 5 × 8 grid over the city of San Francisco.
Figure 1 displays the distribution of the number of hashtags per
post over our entire dataset. For all three cities, there are around
40% of posts without any single hashtag, between 11 and 14% with
one hashtag, 8-9% with two hashtags, and 8% with three hashtags.
The general curve (in red) represents the distribution of number of
hashtags for posts without location check-in. The latter dataset is
collected following the same methodology as in [35]. We randomly
sample over 10 million user IDs on Instagram and collect all their
published posts’ hashtags. In the general set of posts, there are
46% of the posts that include at least one hashtag. This shows that,
almost half of the posts could be targeted by our hashtag-based
location inference attack. The similar trend between the general
curve and those with location information shows that users who
do not reveal their location may nevertheless disclose hashtags
that could then be used by an adversary to infer their locations.
As expected, the distribution drops quite fast with an increasing
number of hashtags, for both datasets with and without location
information. The small increase close to 30 is due to Instagram’s
upper bound of 30 hashtags per post.
5 ATTACK EVALUATION
In this section, we present the evaluation results of our location
inference attack.
5.1 Experimental Setup
As described in Section 3, our attack relies on a random forest
classifier, and we set the number of trees for the random forest to
be 100 following common practice [26].
To comply with the different background knowledge of A1 and
A2, we split the dataset as the following. For adversary A1, we
randomly assign 80% of the posts for training and 20% for testing.
For adversary A2, we split all users randomly: posts from 80% of
the users are put into the training set and posts from the other 20%
are in the testing set. The random split is repeated 10 times, and
we report the average results.
5.2 General Inference Results
Adversaries. We present the performance of our location infer-
ence attack in Table 2. In each city, our attack achieves a strong
prediction. For instance, the accuracy is around 70% for the New
York dataset under adversary A1, which indicates the attacker is
able to predict the exact locations (out of 498) of 20,196 posts (out
of 28,852 testing posts). The small expected distance in all cities
further indicates that even when the prediction is wrong, the at-
tacker is still able to narrow down the target’s location into a small
area. The performance of adversary A2, however, drops in all the
cities. This is because adversary A2 has no prior knowledge of the
hashtag-location association of the targeted users. Nevertheless,
adversary A2 still achieves a relatively high prediction success (e.g.,
the correctness is above 0.55 in London) showing that learning
per-user associations between hashtags and locations is helpful but
not absolutely needed.
Cities. Both adversaries achieve the strongest prediction in London,
followed by Los Angeles and New York. The reasons are manifold,
ranging from cultural differences to hashtag usage. We notice that
New York has the largest number of locations (498), i.e., the highest
number of classes for the random forest model, thus making the
classification the most difficult. Meanwhile, even though both ad-
versaries in Los Angeles achieve the second highest accuracy and
correctness, they perform the worst in the expected distance metric.
This is due to the different densities of the three cities: Los Angeles
covers a larger area with places being more uniformly distributed
in the geographical space than New York and London.
Baseline. To demonstrate that our high prediction performance
is not due to the skewed distribution of the location check-ins, we
further establish a baseline model that relies only on the locations’
distribution (in the training set) to predict a targeted user’s location.
The adversary infers that the user is at the most likely location, i.e.,
the location with most check-ins in the training set, independently
of the hashtags. As depicted in Table 2, both A1 and A2 achieve at
least a 10-time higher accuracy than the baseline, and a 27-time
higher correctness than the baseline. We observe similar results
when the adversary targets all cities at the same time. As for the
expected distance metric, the baseline is outperformed by 3 to 5
times depending on the considered adversary and city.
Other classifiers. Besides random forest, we further experiment
with two other classifiers: gradient boosting machine (GBM) and
support vector machine (SVM). For GBM, we observe that 100 trees
provide the best accuracy, and for SVM, we use the radial basis
function kernel. GBM’s accuracy is around 7% worse than random
forest in all the cities, and SVM achieves the worst performance
with accuracy in London of only 0.15. This suggests that random
forest is the most suitable algorithm for learning the association
between hashtags and locations.
5.3 Privacy vs. Number of Hashtags
Next, we study the relation between the number of shared hashtags
and the prediction performance, i.e., how many hashtags are neces-
sary to determine where a post is shared. To this end, we group the
(a) (b)
Figure 2: Correctness of adversary (a) A1 and (b) A2 with re-
spect to the number of hashtags shared in posts.
posts in the testing set by the number of hashtags they contain and
compute the correctness for each group.
Figure 2 depicts the average correctness for the two adversary
models (results for accuracy follow a very similar trend). As we
can see, for posts appended with only one hashtag, the prediction
performances are relatively weak in all the cases since one hashtag
does not provide enough information. However, when the num-
ber of hashtags increases to two, we observe significant increases
under both adversary models. Especially for A1, the correctness
is increased by more than 40% for all the cities. This shows that
hashtags contain highly location sensitive information. The per-
formance of both adversary models is strongest when the targeted
post contain around 7 hashtags. Beyond this number, we observe
an interesting difference. On one hand, the average correctness of
adversary A1 remains stable for posts with more hashtags. We can
observe a small decrease only for London due the relatively smaller
size of testing data which probably creates more noisy results. On
the other hand, the performance of adversary A2 decreases for all
cities when it faces posts with increasing number of hashtags. This
happens because, by including more hashtags, a user confuses the
classifier which has no information about the past activity of the
user, asA2 has not built user-specific associations between hashtags
and locations. Therefore, a user who has never shared any locations
(the assumption of A2) is less vulnerable to the attack. This, along
with the conclusions drawn from Table 2 that A2 performs worse
than A1 in general, further suggests that a cautious user is always
rewarded in matters of privacy.
5.4 Privacy across All the Cities
So far, our inference attack is conducted at the city level. However,
it is also interesting to see whether our attack can be generalized to
the global level: Given a post with hashtags, can we predict where it
is published among all the locations in New York, Los Angeles and
London. To this end, we combine the datasets from the three cities
together and perform the aforementioned split with respect to the
two adversary models for training and testing. As shown in Table 2,
the performance of the global level attack drops compared to the
city level attack, especially for London and Los Angeles. However,
the attack is still rather effective, e.g, adversary A1 achieves 0.712
accuracy and 0.624 correctness. Meanwhile, the expected distance
grows much larger, which is mainly due to the misclassification
among different cities. However, considering the actual distances
between the three cities, this expected distance is still very small,
and both A1 and A2 perform much better than the baseline model.
Through the above experiments, we have demonstrated the se-
vere privacy threat carried by hashtags. In the next section, we
propose a first of its kind privacy advisor which we coin Tagvisor,
that uses three defensive mechanisms to provide users with advice
when sharing hashtags.
6 COUNTERMEASURES
In this section, we present Tagvisor, a privacy advisor that is based
on different obfuscation mechanisms for enhancing the user’s pri-
vacy and preserving as much semantic utility as possible. We first
introduce the different components of Tagvisor. Then, we describe
our approach for measuring hashtags’ utility. Finally, we present
the three obfuscation mechanisms.
6.1 Tagvisor
Tagvisor resides on the user’s device and, whenever the user wishes
to share a post with some hashtags without revealing his location,
Tagvisor tests whether its classifier can correctly predict the post’s
location, i.e., whether the user’s location privacy is compromised.
If so, Tagvisor suggests alternate sets of hashtags that result in an
enhancement of privacy without significant utility loss. The system
can also suggest the optimal set of hashtags that minimizes the
utility loss while providing a certain level of location privacy.
Formally, the Tagvisor’s defense mechanism can be interpreted
as an optimization problem. For each new post p that a user wants
to share with an original set of hashtags Hp , Tagvisor suggests the
optimal set of hashtags H∗p as follows:
H∗p = argmin
H ′p ∈Hp
∆Hp,H ′p subject to LPH ′p ≥ α . (5)
Here, ∆Hp,H ′p represents the utility loss, quantified by the semantic
distance between Hp and H ′p . LPH ′p represents the privacy level for
the set H ′p , which can be quantified with any of the metrics defined
in Section 2, and α is the minimal privacy level desired by the user.
For example, a simple and intuitive profile would be to set α = 1
with LP measured by db (ℓ∗p , ℓrp ), the inaccuracy. This requirement
ensures that the user only shares hashtags that do not enable the
attacker to infer his exact location ℓrp .
Hp can be as big as the power set of H . In order to keep com-
plexity at a reasonable level, we can restrain it to a smaller subset
depending on the different protection mechanisms and the original
set of hashtags Hp . The user can also set a maximum number of
hashtags that the privacy mechanism canmodify. We evaluate these
more practical constraints in Section 7.
Tagvisor consists of four main blocks. Figure 3 shows the main
components of the Tagvisor system. R, H and G in Recommender
represents obfuscation by Replacement, Hiding and Generalization,
respectively. If the privacy is preserved with the original set of
hashtags chosen by the user, they are directly published (1:YES).
Otherwise, they go to the obfuscator (1:NO) which then sends the
modified sets to the privacy quantifier.
Privacy quantifier. The privacy quantifier contains the trained
classifier, i.e., our random forest model, and a condition checker. The
trained classifier is regularly updated with new knowledge from the
Figure 3: Main building blocks of Tagvisor
external classifier trainer. This classifier trainer uses the data K to
constantly improve its random forest model. It could be running on
the user’s personal computer, or deployed by a non-governmental
organization such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation. The con-
dition checker checks whether the level of location privacy of the
user (using the classifier output) is above the threshold α . If not,
the user chosen hashtags are sent to the obfuscator for determining
alternative hashtag sets. Among these suggested sets of hashtags,
those for which the privacy condition in the condition checker is
satisfied are then fed to the utility quantifier.
Obfuscator. The obfuscator consists of three components that rep-
resent the different obfuscation mechanisms: hiding, replacement
and generalization. Each component produces a set of hashtags by
employing the corresponding defense mechanism. These hashtag
sets are fed to the privacy quantifier which filters out those that do
not meet the required privacy threshold α (2:YES in Figure 3).
Utility quantifier. The utility quantifier also resides on the user’s
device. It maintains records of the utility model and periodically
updates itself by querying the external word2vec converter (which
continuously updates itself with any new data from the knowledge
database K ). As will be described in Subsection 6.2, the utility quan-
tifier uses the semantic representation of each hashtag in the set
of input hashtags that it receives from the privacy quantifier to
calculate their utility with respect to the original set of hashtags.
Finally, it returns the hashtag set(s) providing minimal utility loss
to the recommender. Depending on the user’s preferences, it can
return one recommended hashtag set per obfuscation method (as
shown in Figure 3), or only one optimal hashtag set for all methods.
Recommender. The recommender suggests, for each obfuscation
method, location-privacy-preserving hashtag sets having minimum
semantic distance to the original hashtags chosen by the user. It can
also suggest the optimal hashtag set among all methods, if the user
does not want to make a decision by himself. It could also provide
additional recommendations for a desired obfuscation method and
a desired maximum number of hashtags to be obfuscated.
6.2 Utility Metric
The defense mechanisms should yield hashtags that retain the
semantics of the original hashtags to the largest possible extent,
while still defeating the attacker by misleading the random forest
classifier. Removal of all hashtags, for example, reduces the attacker
to a random guesser. However, for the user, the consequence is a
complete loss of utility.
We rely on the semantic distance between the original set of
hashtags and the sanitized set to quantify the corresponding utility
loss. We capture the semantic meaning of each hashtag, and set
of hashtags, by using word2vec, the state-of-the-art method for
representing language semantics [21, 22]. word2vec maps each
hashtag into a continuous vector space of d dimension,1 i.e.,
word2vec : H → Rd , (6)
using a (shallow) neural network with one hidden layer. The objec-
tive function of word2vec is designed to preserve each hashtag’s
context, i.e., neighboring hashtags. Therefore, if two hashtags are
often shared together in posts, they will be close to each other in
the learned vector space. The concept that word2vec can repre-
sent a word’s semantic meaning originates from the distributional
hypothesis in linguistics, which states that words with similar con-
texts have similar meanings. For example, in our dataset, #travel
and #tourist are semantically close under word2vec. We define the
word2vec representation of a hashtag h as ®vh = word2vec(h).
We train our word2vec model on the whole set of posts available
to obtain a semantic vector for each hashtag in H . Following previ-
ous works [16, 36], we express the semantic meaning of hashtags
Hp in a post p as the average of their semantic vectors:
®mHp =
∑
h∈Hp ®vh
|Hp | . (7)
Then, the utility loss of replacing the original set Hp by H ′p is
measured as the Euclidean distance between ®mHp and ®mH ′p :
∆Hp,H ′p = | | ®mHp − ®mH ′p | |. (8)
We use Euclidean distance since it is the most common method to
measure distances in the word2vec generated vector space [21, 22].
6.3 Obfuscation Mechanisms
We now describe the three obfuscation mechanisms used by Tagvi-
sor for protecting location privacy.
Hiding. Hiding (also referred to as deletion) simply suggests a sub-
set of the original hashtags Hp chosen by the user. There are in total
2 |Hp | − 1 such subsets. One can limit the number of hashtags to be
removed by the threshold th to optimize the running time, or utility.
All generated subsets of hashtags are sent to the condition checker
to verify whether they satisfy the location privacy constraint. The
subsets providing enough privacy are sent to the utility quantifier
that picks the one that minimizes utility loss.
Replacement. This mechanism replaces the original hashtags by
others in the set of hashtags H to mislead the adversary. In order to
keep the search complexity reasonable, we have to restrain the set
of potential hashtags to replace each original hashtag with. We fix
1Following the original works [21, 22], d is set to 100 in our experiments.
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Figure 4: Evolution of the accuracy (A1) with respect to different original numbers of hashtags to be shared (x-axis) and num-
bers of hashtags to be obfuscated (from 0 to 3) for (a) hiding, (b) replacement, and (c) generalization in New York.
a threshold ts and focus on the ts hashtags that are semantically
closest to the original hashtag, as defined in Equation 8. This en-
sures that the set of candidate hashtags minimizes utility loss. This
bounds the search space from above by (ts + 1) |Hp | − 1. As in the
hiding mechanism, one can further reduce the time complexity by
bounding the number of hashtags to be replaced by a threshold
tr similar to th . The generated subsets are eventually sent to the
privacy condition checker and the utility quantifier.
Generalization. This mechanism generalizes each original hash-
tag by one representing a semantically broader category. Our eval-
uation only focuses on hashtags corresponding to locations in
Foursquare. Every location identifier in Foursquare is mapped to a
category identifier at two levels. For example, Harrods has the cate-
gory department store at the second, lower, level and category shop
at the first, higher, level. Since not all hashtags are generalizable
(e.g., #love or #instagood), we represent the subset of generalizable
hashtags in a given post as Hд ⊆ Hp . The search space is then
equal to 3Hд − 1. To reduce the time complexity, we can also fix a
threshold tд of the maximum number of hashtags to be generalized.
7 DEFENSE EVALUATION
In this section, we present the evaluation results of the defense
mechanisms presented in the previous section. We concentrate on
the results for the strongest adversary, A1, in New York since it
includes the maximum number of users and locations. The results
for Los Angeles and London follow a similar trend, which we skip
due to space constraints. We consider ts = 2 for the replacement
mechanism in order to reduce the search space, and thus improve
the time efficiency. The other parameters th , tr and tд are left free
and their impact is evaluated in our experiments.
We begin with the impact of obfuscating hashtags on the attack
accuracy (thus privacy) with respect to each obfuscation mecha-
nism. Then, we compare the utility (corresponding to the obtained
privacy level) between the hashtags suggested by the three obfusca-
tion mechanisms separately and the optimal global solution. Finally,
we evaluate the time efficiency of Tagvisor.
7.1 Accuracy vs. Obfuscation Level
Figure 4 shows the impact of (a) hiding, (b) replacement, and (c)
generalization on the attack accuracy in New York. Except for
generalization, we notice that the larger the number of hashtags ob-
fuscated, the lower the average accuracy (different curves), thus the
higher the privacy, as expected. We additionally observe that, even
with 10 original number of hashtags, the average accuracy with
two obfuscated hashtags only is already very low (smaller than 0.2).
This means that the attacker is able to correctly infer the location of
only less than 20% of the sample posts. These results demonstrate
the effectiveness of the hiding and replacement mechanisms. How-
ever, generalization (Figure 4(c)) cannot bound the accuracy of the
attack when the number of hashtags to be shared increases. Note
that the curves are less smooth in this latter case because we have
more constraint on our testing set: our testing set is much smaller
for this scenario since not all hashtags are generalizable.
7.2 Utility vs. Privacy
While the previous subsection does not consider any optimization
of utility, in this subsection we assume that the user relies on the
optimization problem defined in (5). For our experiments, we mea-
sure location privacy by the inaccuracy and set α = 1. This means
that the user wants to release a subset H ′p that leads to a misclassifi-
cation of the location and minimizes the utility loss. Note that, for a
very few samples in the testing set, the adversary can still infer the
correct location based solely on the locations distribution (baseline
in Section 5), against which Tagvisor cannot help.
Figure 5(a) shows the cumulative distribution function of the
minimal utility loss over all test samples, for the three obfuscation
mechanisms, and the optimal one (when the optimization consid-
ers all mechanisms together). First, we observe that replacement
provides close to optimal utility and is selected for the optimal
solution in 85% of the cases, against 14% for hiding, and 1% for
generalization. We also notice that hiding provides higher utility
than generalization if the mechanisms are considered separately.
We explain this result as follows: First, replacement misleads the
classifier but at the same time keeps enough utility as the fake hash-
tags are by design chosen to be semantically close to the original
hashtags. Second, generalization provides worse utility than hiding
because it must modify more hashtags than hiding to reach the
same privacy level, thereby increasing the semantic distance.
We further compare the absolute semantic distances given by all
four approaches and the semantic distance in random pairs of posts
(purple plain curve). This baseline utility curve is constructed by
randomly sampling 10,000 pairs of posts in our dataset. We observe
in Figure 5(a) that 90% of the privacy-preserving hashtag sets have
a semantic distance smaller than 3 to the original hashtag sets for
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Figure 5: (a) Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of theminimumutility loss, i.e., semantic distance, formaximumprivacy
constraint, of the three obfuscation mechanisms and the optimal one among all mechanisms. (b) Average minimum semantic
distance of the original hashtags from the optimal solution (unbounded) and solutions with an upperbound on the number of
hashtags to be obfuscated with respect to the number of original hashtags (x-axis) (c) Average running time of Tagvisor (per
sample) with respect to the number of original hashtags.
replacement whereas, for deletion and generalization, the corre-
sponding distance is around 6, and the distance between random
pairs goes up to 11. This demonstrates that we can keep a relatively
fair amount of semantic utility with the replacement mechanism.
Finally, we observe in Figure 5(b) (“unbounded” curve) that the
utility loss is in general smaller when the original number of hash-
tags is larger. This can be explained by the fact that, when we
increase the number of hashtags, we have a larger set of hashtags
to obfuscate. Obfuscating 2 or 3 hashtags already brings enough
privacy, as shown in Figure 4. In other words, the relative change in
the semantics of hashtags is smaller when we have a larger original
set of hashtags. When the user has originally one or two hashtags
with which the adversary correctly infers his location, he has to
remove one or two hashtags to mislead the adversary, and thus
loses most of his utility.
7.3 Time Performance
We now present the running time which is an important factor for
Tagvisor’s usability, and we propose solutions for trading off time
efficiency with optimality. All the experiments are conducted on
a laptop computer with 3.3 GHz CPU and 16 GB memory, and are
implemented relying on Python packages such as pandas, numpy,
and scikit-learn. It is worth noting that our experiments can be
further optimized by using more efficient programming languages
or libraries, and by parallelizing the computations, e.g., of the three
obfuscation methods. Also, current smartphones’ computing capa-
bilities are shown to be close to those of laptops [1].
Figure 5(c) shows how the running time evolves with an increas-
ing number of hashtags. It clearly demonstrates that the optimal
solution (“unbounded” curve) is not practical when the original
number of hashtags goes beyond 5. For instance, it takes more than
2 seconds for 6 hashtags. Even if most posts are shared with fewer
than 6 hashtags, we want to provide a (nearly) optimal and efficient
mechanism for users willing to share 6 or more hashtags.
Each curve in Figure 5(c) denotes a different maximum number of
hashtags that can be obfuscated. We observe that, by bounding this
maximum number to two, we obtain a total running time of around
one second for any number of original hashtags, which is very
satisfactory. We can even reach half a second by bounding it to one
hashtag. At the same time, we can observe in Figure 5(b) that the
utility obtained with this maximum number bounded by one is very
close to the optimal utility already. With this number bounded by
two, the corresponding utility curve and the optimal one can hardly
be differentiated. From a privacy perspective, even by bounding
to two obfuscated hashtags, we get an average accuracy equal to
0.038, which is smaller than the baseline value (0.053) reported in
Section 5. Only with an upperbound of one hashtag, we get an
accuracy (equal to 0.21) greater than the baseline. This shows that
bounding the number of possible hashtags to be obfuscated to two
provides the best utility-privacy-efficiency trade-off.
8 DISCUSSION
We discuss here some important details of our proposal. First of all,
our attack is orthogonal to the use of computer vision techniques
as it does not rely on the photo content or any visual background
at all. It relies only on hashtags to make it applicable to a wider
variety of settings. Of course, if the posts contain photos in addition
to hashtags and the background of the photos is comprehensible,
a human or advances in computer vision might sometimes have
better chances of identifying the location of a photo. The evaluation
of the privacy impact of such cases is left for future work.
Second, one may think that the set of sanitized hashtags shared
via Tagvisor could be used by the adversary to improve his machine-
learning model. Despite being intuitive, this statement does not
hold. First, the location is by definition not shared with the hashtags
released using Tagvisor, thus cannot be used to train the adversary’s
classifier. Indeed, someone uses Tagvisor if he wants to hide his
location. Moreover, the location that the adversary infers via hash-
tags does not provide him with any extra information than what is
already contained in his trained classifier. Only the new knowledge
brought by users sharing both hashtags and their locations (i.e., not
using Tagvisor) will be incorporated into the knowledge base K .
Third, our semantics-based utility metric does not necessarily
encompass the purposes of all users. This motivated us to leave
some degrees of freedom to the users in Tagvisor, as explained in
Section 6. Concretely, the user can decide to either let the appli-
cation directly suggest the optimal set of hashtags, or suggest the
best sets for each obfuscation mechanism. The user can even set
a minimum/maximum number of hashtags to be shared, also for
each mechanism, and receive recommendations. We believe that
this approach brings both usability and maximal utility for all users.
A user study to analyze the acceptance of Tagvisor among OSN
users would be an interesting future work.
Finally, by requiring that posts contain both hashtags and lo-
cations, our dataset may be biased towards users that are more
willing to share locations. Our high accuracy in the location infer-
ence attack could be partially attributed to this bias in the testing set.
However, one must realize that we cannot avoid such a restriction
as we need the ground truth on the location to evaluate the attack
performance. In the worst case, our attack evaluation provides a
lower bound on the average privacy of sharing hashtags. Moreover,
as shown in Figure 1, users usually share hashtags, to a large extent
regardless of whether they jointly share their location. The training
set is a priori not biased, as even the adversary must have access to
both location and hashtag information to train his classifier.
9 RELATEDWORK
Location privacy. Shokri et al. [34] propose a comprehensive
framework for quantifying location privacy. This framework is able
to capture various prior information available to an attacker and
attacks the attacker can perform. The authors of [34] also propose
several privacy metrics, which inspire the metrics used in this paper.
Ağır et al. [3] further analyze the impact of revealing location se-
mantics, such as restaurant or cinema, by extending the underlying
graphical model used for location inference in [34]. Experimental
results on a Foursquare dataset demonstrate that location semantics
can raise severe privacy concerns. Bilogrevic et al. [5] concentrate
on the utility implications of one popular privacy-preservingmecha-
nism, namely generalization (both geographically and semantically).
Through the data collected from 77 OSN users, their model is able
to accurately predict the motivation behind location sharing, which
enables design of privacy-preserving location-sharing applications.
Other interesting works in this field include [27, 31, 32]. Contrary to
these previous works, ours focuses on the location-privacy risks of
hashtag sharing, and propose mechanisms to mitigate these risks.
Hashtag analysis. Highfield and Leaver [13] point out the re-
search challenges for Instagram, especially in comparison to Twit-
ter, by examining hashtags in the two OSNs. Based on a dataset
collected from Instagram users’ profiles and hashtags, Han et al.
[12] identify teens and adults using popular supervised learning
techniques and additionally reveal significant behavioral differ-
ences between the two age groups. The authors of [35] use #selfie
in Instagram to study the phenomenal ubiquitous convention of
self-portrait, while the authors of [20] study the health implications
and obesity patterns associated with the use of #foodporn. More
recently, Lamba et al. [17] study #selfie in Twitter that can poten-
tially cause life threat. Although no previous work has addressed
privacy issues arising out of hashtags to the best of our knowledge,
the aforementioned works have been very influential in shaping
our approach of using hashtags for training our attacker model.
Location prediction in OSNs. Multiple works aim at estimating
a user’s home location using the posts he has published in OSNs.
Cheng et al. [8] identify words in tweets with a strong local geo-
scope and estimate several possible locations for each user with
decreasing probabilities. Chandra et al. [7] predict city-level user
location relying on a communication model in Twitter’s conver-
sation. Jurgens et al. [15] recently provide a survey on the related
works in this direction. Different from these studies, we address
the problem of identifying the precise location of users’ posts.
Some other works concentrate on estimating the location of each
post, which is closer to the problem we address. Li et al. [18] use KL-
Divergence to build a language model for each location. Due to the
insufficient number of tweets for each location, they incorporate
texts in web pages returned by search engines to support their
model. Agerwal et al. [2] also use geographic gazeteer data as
vocabulary to identify location names from phrases in tweets. The
approach of Dalvi et al. [11] assumes that a geo-located object is
mentioned in the tweet. Our attack however does not need any
external knowledge and already shows a high accuracy in predicting
the exact point of interest. Moreover, we propose a tool for privacy-
preserving hashtag sharing.
10 CONCLUSION
The rapid adoption of new concepts and tools poses novel risks
towards privacy that users are not always aware of. In this paper, we
thoroughly investigate the impact of hashtag sharing on location
privacy. We present and show the effectiveness of a random forest
classifier that uses hashtags for fine-grained location inference
within and across cities. In order to counter the proposed attack, we
propose three obfuscation mechanisms and an efficient system that
determines the optimal/near-optimal set of hashtags to preserve
privacy without degrading significantly the original utility.
Our work demonstrates a clear threat towards location privacy
stemming from the use of hashtags. Even though some users inten-
tionally use hashtags to reveal their (more or less accurate) locations,
many of them do not make use of hashtags that are clearly linked to
location information, and thus should expect some level of location
privacy. In the context of privacy, even a moderately large abso-
lute number of affected individuals represents a serious enough
negative effect [10], which is effectively reduced by our proposed
privacy-preserving system, Tagvisor.
As future work, we plan to study how the publication time of
the post can help improve the classifier’s success. Besides temporal
information, other cues could boost the accuracy of the inference
attack, for example, social proximity to already geo-located users or
use of deep learning on the images to identify background locations,
etc. All these can further degrade users’ location privacy, and it
will be interesting to incorporate them in our framework in the
future. Another direction for future work would be to incorporate
defenses against other privacy threats arising out of hashtags such
as demographics, linkability and friendship between users.
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